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Editor’s Introduction

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IN THIS VOLUME OF PRECOLLEGE PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC PRACTICE (P4), we offer exciting, new features that will be of interest to our readers. For the first time, we are publishing a Notes from the Field selection in P4. This feature provides a space for practitioners of precollege and public philosophy to share and focus on reflections, questions, and challenges relating to their work with young people and/or in public philosophy projects of diverse kinds. Jane Rutstein Shay offers valuable insights in our first Notes from the Field contribution, reflecting on the promise and challenge of discussing multiculturalism and ethical relativism in her 5th grade classroom. Rutstein Shay notes the “positive friction” that can emerge in these conversations, and when done effectively, lead to productive questioning, examining of assumptions, and philosophical dialogue between students.

Additionally, this volume includes our first Book Symposium, featuring comments from Stephen Kekoa Miller and Wendy C. Turgeon on Thomas E. Wartenberg’s Thinking Through Stories. Wartenberg, a leader in advancing the use of children’s literature in precollege philosophy, provides a useful introduction to the importance of practicing philosophy with children, and, also, a generous response to the commentaries of Miller and Turgeon.

Our thanks to Nate Olson, Chaeyeon Lee, and Amanda Fulford who offered insightful reviews, respectively, of Roberta Israeloff and Karen Mizell’s (editors) The Ethics Bowl Way: Answering Questions, Questioning Answers, and Creating Ethical Communities, Jana Mohr Lone’s Seen and Not Heard: Why Children’s Voices Matter, and Lee McIntyre, Nancy McHugh, and Ian Olasov’s (editors) A Companion to Public Philosophy. Collectively, these reviews provide our readers with a nuanced understanding of significant advances in precollege and public philosophy scholarship.

In “Philosophy with Children: Considering Factors to Facilitate Voice,” Claire Cassidy proposes methods for supporting children’s voice through philosophy with children and the Community of Inquiry. She focuses deeply on
the role of teachers in supporting voice in the classroom and develops both a theoretically rich and actionable consideration of seven factors for enabling voice identified through the Look Who’s Talking project. The seven factors are as follows: definition, power, inclusivity, listening, time and space, approaches, processes and purposes.

Sadly, Sol Neely, a member of our P4 community of authors, passed away in 2022. I want to take a moment here to acknowledge Sol’s work, spirit, and strong legacy. Sol was an extremely creative public philosopher, a generous thinker, a brave activist, and an all-around awesome human being with positive energy in abundance. He was a scholar of Indigenous Studies and a dedicated husband and father. Among his many accomplishments, Sol founded the Flying University, a higher education program inside Lemon Creek Correctional Center in Juneau, Alaska. For seven years, he brought University of Alaska Southeast students into the facility for collaborative study and dialogue with incarcerated pupils. Sol published an article in P4, volume 4 (2022) on this project—“Organic Intellectuals in the Prison: Reports from the Flying University on Philosophy as a Public Practice”—and it demonstrates his skill and creativity as a philosopher and educator. Sol is deeply missed. It was an honor to know him and to learn from his work.

In closing this brief introduction, and as I step away from the P4 Editor-in-Chief role, I want to offer tremendous thanks, as always, to P4’s associate editors Karen Emmerman and Kris Phillips, editorial advisor Roberta Israeloff, and managing editor Kelly Laas for their energy, enthusiasm, and dedication to our journal. It has been a pleasure working with all of you as a team and I’m very proud of what we have accomplished in creating this open-access research forum for the advancement of precollege and public philosophy scholarship.
Philosophy with Children: Considering Factors to Facilitate Voice

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ABSTRACT: This article proposes that children's voice is important. It also suggests that one way in which children's voice might be supported is through Philosophy with Children. However, when teachers undertake Philosophy with Children to promote children's voice, it is important that they reflect on their role and the practice to consider how that role and practice enable children's voice. One way in which teachers might do this is by considering the seven factors for enabling children's voice identified through the Look Who's Talking project. The seven factors are as follows: definition, power, inclusivity, listening, time and space, approaches, processes and purposes. The article takes each element in turn to consider the ways in which Philosophy with Children might align with them and offers questions teachers may ask of themselves and their practice. As there is a range of approaches to Philosophy with Children, the article focuses on one model: Community of Philosophical Inquiry.

KEYWORDS: Philosophy with Children, voice, listening, practice, Look Who's Talking.

Voice and Childhood
VOICE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY PROMINENT IN DISCUSSIONS SURROUNDING CHILDREN’S LIVES IN RECENT YEARS. Arguably, this is due to the increasing attention to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) (United Nations 1989), which has been ratified by all countries barring one (the USA). Part one of Article 12 of the UNCRC states, “States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”
At the outset, it is worth noting that this article tends to provoke discussions relating to children’s voice and participation, where participation is often conflated with voice and voice is seen to be an expression of views. Indeed, Lundy (2007) highlights that thinking of Article 12 in this way may diminish the potential impact of what is intended by the authors of the Convention. She explains that abbreviating Article 12 to, for example, “the right to be heard” or “the right to be consulted” allows adults to avoid a key element of the article—that children have a right to express their views “in all matters” affecting them.

The notion of voice as the sharing of views or opinions is common, though Robinson and Taylor (2007) recognize “voice” as a controversial term. One aspect of the controversy surrounds the sense that it suggests children all speak with one voice. Clearly, like adults, they do not (Cassidy 2012), and to avoid this suggestion, the noun “voice” is often pluralised. It might also be seen as controversial because often it has an adjective attached to it: student or pupil. Talking of student and/or pupil voice limits children’s voice to the place where they are most often found—the school. Indeed, traditionally classroom talk consists of the teacher asking questions that are often very directive or closed, children trying to guess what’s in the teacher’s head, and the teacher moving the discussion on to reach a desired endpoint determined by a series of learning outcomes (Mercer 1995, 1996; Wegerif 2005; Cassidy and Christie 2013; Splitter 2016). In this sense, voice is not promoted, though there is potential for it to be. However, while it is certainly the case that there is scope for voice—a range of voices—to be heard in school, children are not only pupils or students; their lives reach beyond school into the wider world (Wall K. et al. 2019). They are, after all, like adults, part of society (Biesta, Lawy, and Kelly 2009), and this includes very young children (Bartels, Onstenk, and Veugelers 2016).

There is an added dimension to the challenge that children’s voice presents to adults. Voice is a loaded, even political, term (Wall J. 2010). It not only recognizes the owner of the voice but also suggests an element of capacity or agency (Holdsworth 2000; Wall J. 2010), where agency is seen as having the wherewithal to act and to influence the world in which they find themselves. When the owner of the voice happens to be a child, it may be considered as problematic because children’s agency often goes unrecognized. Arguably, it goes further, children’s agency is not countenanced in the first place. Acknowledging the voice of children acknowledges their agency (Shultz and Guimaraes-Iosif 2012; Horgan 2017) and sees them as participants in society beyond the classroom, which, in some way, elevates their status in that society. Cook-Sather (2006) recognizes this, asserting that having a presence in society alludes to individuals’ power, and this facilitates participation.

There are reasons that some adults consider elevating children’s status as problematic, and these present challenges to realizing children’s voice. There is tension in accepting that children have the capacity to act and influence the
world they inhabit, but this requires a recognition of capacity, which is problematic. Much understanding of children’s capacities is premised on the work of developmental psychologists such as Piaget (Donaldson 1978; Matthews 1994, Cassidy 2007; Matthews 2008; Murris 2016; Green 2017), which fails to allow for children’s agency. Often, children are portrayed as deficient in some sense, that they lack the likes of reason and self-regulation. Indeed, while this is the case for children generally, this perceived lack is emphasized further for very young children. In suggesting that children have the capacity to enact and effect change, a challenge to adult status is felt. Children may not agree with adults and the systems and structures they have created (Wall J. 2010, 2019; Sundhall 2017), and this is uncomfortable and challenging for some adults.

Reed-Sandoval and Sykes (2017) discuss positionality, seeing this as the way in which one is located—and locates oneself—in relation to cultural, political, economic, and social networks. Like John Wall (2010) and Sundhall (2017), they highlight that adult positionality may be troubled if children’s views or participation challenges adults’ views. Indeed, they reach further to show that for some children, those from marginalized groups, their voice is even more diminished (Chetty 2014; Reed-Sandoval and Sykes 2017; Chetty, Gregory, and Laverty 2022). This resonates with the suggestion that some children are discriminated against by adults on more than one count: firstly, they may belong to a marginalized group, and secondly, they are children. This fails to take account of Spyrou’s (2019) assertion that children are networked and should be recognized as such. A linear, non-networked view of the child diminishes the possibility of children having voice and agency (Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020). It plays into the narrative of children as adults-in-waiting, as becoming (Kennedy 2006; Cassidy 2007; Stables 2008) and, therefore, not (full) members of society. The issue at play is often that if children’s capacities are recognized and their agency is permitted full rein, their places within and the relationships they may have with that society are called into question (Kohan 2014; Murris 2016, 2017; Gheaus, Calder, and De Wispelaere 2018). It is, after all, adults that often determine what children may become, along with their opportunities in the present (Giesinger 2017), so it may be in their interest—or not—to recognize, accept, and facilitate children’s voice. In effect, this is a question of power or authority. Adults are generally seen to have more authority in the world than children, including being able to demonstrate that power through the control they may exert over children. Arnott and Kate Wall (2022) suggest that power should not be seen as a finite entity, that it belongs to only one or the other—adult or child. Instead, they propose that power shifts between individuals, including between adult/child, depending on the relationship at play.

Regardless of one’s age or status, there may be transformative intentions in using one’s voice; it may indicate that one is making a deliberate statement (Fielding 2004). Indeed, voice is often seen to represent the spoken word (Rudduck
In their work focusing on young children, Kate Wall et al. (2019) assert that voice reaches beyond the spoken word or even verbal utterances and that we must attend to the various ways in which voice might manifest itself. They propose that voice may be evidenced through children’s body language, actions, pauses in action, behaviour, glances, movements, artistic expressions, or silences. They accept Fielding’s (2004) notion that voice is an expression of self and propose that this does not need to be articulated through words.

Indeed, the idea of silence with respect to voice is an interesting one and one to which Johansson (2022) encourages us to attend. This is not the same as children’s voice being mediated or filtered by adults (Roberts 2000; Komulainen 2007; Lansdown 2010; Bucknall 2014; Cassidy, Conrad, and Figueiroa-Rego 2019), though this may be seen as silencing in some respects because adults, even with the best of intentions, interpret what children wish to convey. Lewis (2010) draws attention to the power of silence and notes that it is neither neutral nor empty, an important consideration when reflecting on the relationship between children and adults with respect to facilitating and recognizing children’s voice. Spyrou (2016) suggests that not paying attention to silence oversimplifies voice and that this is an often-neglected area of study. If it is neglected in research, it might be safe to suggest that it also lacks consideration in practice. In the same way, Hanna (2021) draws our attention to silence as worthy of attention, particularly because in failing to recognize silence, injustices may arise that result in reinforcing traditional power dynamics.

Further, caution needs to be taken when considering how children’s voice, including their silence, might be facilitated. The language of “giving children a voice” is unhelpful (Bucknall 2014; Semenec 2018). It assumes they do not have voice, and, beyond that, it implies it is in the gift of others—usually adults—to allow it. This reinforces the paternalistic view that adults know best (Giesinger 2017), with such a view running the risk of perpetuating the epistemic injustice experienced by children (Kennedy 2010; Murris 2013; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020), in which, simply because they are children, what they say is at best not credited and at worst ignored entirely. As suggested above, lying at the heart of questions of children’s voice is the need to acknowledge that children have a place within society and that they should be taken seriously. Of course, this is not to suggest that children’s voice trumps adults’ voice or that they should have more space than adults for their voice; rather, it is a suggestion that their voice should be given “due weight,” as the UNCRC suggests. The notion of “due weight” is often reduced to a discussion of children’s capacities, in which they are seen to be deficient in some regard (Hendrick 2000; Hammersley 2017; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020). This is a complex and challenging notion given that many adults do not have the capacity to express their voice in relation to all manner of topics (Cassidy 2017; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020). Care must be taken that assumptions are not made about their capacities simply because they are children,
as this may result in their voice not being heard. Indeed, it may be even more basic than this, that their voice is neither invited nor expected. In their study of what children wanted as their ideal society, Conrad, Cassidy, and Mathis (2015) note that there are very few spaces in which children can explore their views with others, where they can try out their thinking and consider the ideas of others. Space is one element that Lundy (2007) identifies as being vital if Article 12 is to be realized. It is also one of seven factors identified as necessary for facilitating very young children’s voice through the Look Who’s Talking project (Wall K. et al. 2017; Wall K. et al., 2019). The Look Who’s Talking project was created with the goal of promoting children’s voice, particularly the voice of young children. In addressing this focus, the project set to explore how voice is understood and supported in various early years settings, with a view of offering advice to practitioners. Seven factors for consideration were identified by Kate Wall and her colleagues and are directed toward practitioners to encourage them to reflect on their practice in enabling children’s voice.

The Seven Factors

The factors for facilitating very young children’s voice presented by Kate Wall et al. (2017; 2019) are as follows: definition, power, inclusivity, listening, time and space, approaches, processes and purpose. The authors note that these are not definitive features, but they recommend them as good starting points for practitioner reflection and offer a series of questions designed to shape their practice in eliciting children’s voice. Kate Wall et al.’s (2017; 2019) focus on very young children is interesting as work in this area is limited, though, increasingly, the subject of children’s voice is becoming more prominent in research. Kate Wall and her colleagues recognize that young children have voice, that they are members of society, and that they have an element of agency. Given that Philosophy with Children (PwC) also recognizes the place of children in society and that philosophizing with children is one way in which they might participate in that society (Matthews 1994; Cassidy 2012, 2017; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020), it may be helpful to consider the extent to which the seven factors identified above may support teachers in considering voice in their own practice in relation to PwC. This is not, though, about determining why one might undertake PwC, as much has been written on this already (Lipman 2003; Anderson 2020). Rather, the suggestion is that teachers might use the factors to consider their own practice in PwC with a view to supporting children’s voice. Some questions that teachers might ask themselves to aid in that reflection have been provided.

Community of Philosophical Inquiry

There are different approaches to PwC; the focus in this article will be on McCall’s Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI). CoPI, as developed by McCall, grew out of her work with Matthew Lipman in the early 1990s (McCall
There are some similarities with Lipman’s program as there are with other approaches to PwC, but it is not the same (for an explanation of differences and similarities, see McCall 2009). The term PwC is used in this article as a generic term for the various approaches to practising Philosophy with Children, while CoPI will be referred to when discussing this specific approach.

Very simply put, CoPI participants sit in a circle with the facilitator outside the circle. The session begins with a stimulus being read aloud by the participants. The stimulus is usually a written piece, perhaps a short story, a newspaper article, a poem, song lyrics, or the like. Following this element, the participants are invited to ask questions that are noted by the facilitator who then selects the question for the ensuing dialogue. Usually, the person who asked the chosen question is invited to contribute first. Thereafter, participants raise their hands and wait to be called to speak. They will not necessarily be called in the order in which they raise their hands. When they speak, they begin by saying, “I agree/disagree with [person’s name] because . . . ” Participants may not refer to an authority for their reasons for the dis/agreement, they should not use technical language or jargon, and there is no search for a conclusion or consensus at the end of the session (McCall 2009; Cassidy 2007, 2017; Conrad et al. 2015).

**Definition**

Kate Wall et al. (2017, 2019) hold that a definition of voice is first required by practitioners if they are to support children’s voice. In relation to PwC, the voice of the teacher is significant in the promotion of children’s voice. This, therefore, requires teachers to explore what voice means for them as facilitators of philosophical inquiry. In McCall’s Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) (McCall 2009; Cassidy 2007, 2017), the facilitator is less conspicuous than in some other approaches to PwC. She does not offer comments on what has been said or present views or even questions of her own. Her participation in the dialogue is to juxtapose perspectives through her selection of the speakers and to ask questions only for clarification of a particular point (Cassidy 2007, 2017; McCall 2009). To some extent, then, the voice of the facilitator within CoPI is quietened, at least in terms of her audible voice. If voice includes aspects such as actions, then the facilitator’s voice in CoPI is a feature. She selects the order in which participants speak with the goal of juxtaposing speakers to take the dialogue forward. She may ask participants to define a word they have used or offer an example to illustrate a point. In this way, she is able to influence the dialogue, though her responsibility is to ensure the dialogue remains as philosophical as possible and that the participants have ownership of the dialogue, in that they can direct where it goes. She has to be careful that her voice does not dominate. It is perhaps this element of the definition that requires attention from the teacher, who may ask questions such as the following: *How do I support the dialogue in being philosophical without dominating the dialogue? In what ways might I ensure...*
that my voice is not heard more than the children’s? How might I frame my interventions so that I say less but still support the dialogue? To what extent does my non-audible voice impact upon participants and the dialogue?

Power

There is power associated with being the facilitator. Cassidy et al. (2022) are clear that voice is about power, whether that is having voice or supporting voice, and teachers need to be conscious of the role they have in enabling children’s voice. It would be easy for them to silence it.

Kate Wall et al. (2019) note that there are power imbalances between children and adults. This is, of course, true in the classroom context. In this context, therefore, power relates to the authority or ability one has to diminish the agency or autonomy of another. In classrooms generally, teachers (adults) have the power to determine who does what, who goes where, what happens, when things happen, and who has opportunities to express their voice. Indeed, the agendas in classrooms are almost entirely set by adults (Anderson 2020).

In CoPI there is scope for the power imbalance to undermine children’s voice. Situating herself outwith the CoPI circle, the facilitator moves around in order to observe the participants. After all, if voice is more than verbal utterances, she needs to pay attention to participants’ body language to support how she chooses the sequence of speakers. However, standing above the participants seated in the circle requires sensitivity to where one stands in relation to the group and to the individuals within that group. It would be easy to dominate a group of children physically or by being overly authoritarian (Robinson 2011).

While CoPI has rules for participants to follow, these are designed to facilitate the philosophical content of the dialogue.

Kate Wall et al. (2019) see the teacher as co-inquirer, which is one way of limiting the power of the teacher. However, in CoPI, because the teacher as facilitator does not explicitly explore the topic under discussion with the children, she could not be considered a co-inquirer in the sense that Kate Wall et al. might suggest. Instead, Johansson’s (2022) notion of co-being may be helpful, where the facilitator is in the dialogic moment with the children. In stepping aside from conspicuously inquiring with the children about a particular question, the facilitator arguably relinquishes power to offer the children control of the dialogue, thereby ensuring they can direct the dialogue and exercise their voice. This does not mean that the facilitator loses all control but that power in the session is shared and that in some moments the children are more in charge, have more power, than the adult. This aligns with Arnott and Kate Wall’s (2022) suggestion that power is not entirely in the possession of the teacher or the children but that it moves along a continuum.

The facilitator selects who speaks in a CoPI dialogue. The facilitator should be cautious in exerting her power with respect to this element of her role. Unlike
the traditional role of the teacher, with teachers selecting contributors to a dis-

cussion without much consideration of the way they will contribute, in CoPI

the teacher as facilitator has loyalty to the dialogue, so she selects speakers in an

order that is likely to take the dialogue further philosophically. This means that
she could choose not to call on particular individuals at a particular time. Care
must be taken to ensure that voices are not silenced and that all participants have
the opportunity to contribute.

Interestingly, power may also manifest itself for the facilitator through si-

cence. She has power not to choose a speaker at a particular moment to structure
the dialogue, to allow a pause for thinking time, and to control the dynamic of
the dialogue. The balance of power may switch to the participants if they choose
not to speak, to remain silent. The facilitator must read this silence. The silence
may be philosophically interesting. Perhaps what is not said, what is omitted
from dialogue, makes it interesting. Johannson (2022) urges the facilitator to at-
tend to the spaces between what is spoken. This silence may be deliberate on the
part of the participants if there is an area into which they do not wish to stray
(Chetty 2014; Reed-Sandoval and Sykes 2017), perhaps due to the adult pres-

cence, particularly if they wish to protect themselves and/or their family's privacy
(Hanna 2021). Or it may be as a consequence of the participants choosing to
focus their philosophical attention elsewhere. Perhaps the participants are not
interested—they may be confused, they may have nothing to contribute, they
may not wish to participate, or they may be thinking something through. In
reading the silence, the facilitator recognizes the children's power. Indeed, in in-
viting the children to engage in dialogue, the facilitator is offering power to the
children and is, therefore, relinquishing some of the power she may, at other
times, exhibit in the classroom context.

Acknowledging one's power as teacher, as facilitator, as adult in the class-

room is important. There is tension between being the adult facilitator who
selects the question, who determines who speaks and in which order, and say-
ing that this enables voice, because it may appear that she controls the dialogue.
However, the facilitator has expertise that cannot be ignored. She generally has
experience and expertise in engaging with philosophy and in philosophical dia-
logue. In choosing the question, selecting the order of the speakers, and asking
for clarification, she draws on her expertise to scaffold the children's philosophi-
cal dialogue. As Splitter (2016) says, questions posed by the participants are more
likely to engender curiosity, and, in agreement, McCall (2009) extends this by
suggesting that the facilitator arguably recognizes the question with the strongest
philosophical potential and takes on the responsibility of choosing which of the
participants’ questions are explored. In acting thus, she works to create a fertile
ground on which the children may plant their philosophical seeds so that they
might flourish. There is an interdependence that is important. Power between
adults and children is not an all-or-nothing concept; it is relational, and children
draw on the expertise of the adult to serve their own ends in the dialogue. The CoPI facilitator’s role is to support, even model, but not to diminish children’s voice. The moves she makes should be to open dialogue rather than to corral the children in a particular direction. Instead, she positions herself in relation to the children and creates the context to allow for inquiry; she recognises and accepts that the children should control the dialogue and that she is there to serve it (McCall 2009). Children’s voice need not be diminished because an adult has a role in the context. There are some questions, therefore, one may ask oneself in considering the element of power when seeking to facilitate children’s voice through CoPI. Here are some examples: Do children wish to participate in philosophical dialogue? Where and how do I position myself during the dialogue? To what extent will my interventions take the dialogue forward philosophically? How do I read participants’ silence during CoPI, and what do I do as a consequence of this?

Inclusivity

Although the facilitator has an element of control in CoPI in terms of ensuring the rules are followed and in choosing the speakers, it is important that she considers how she will ensure that all children are included. It is worth noting that age is not a barrier to participating in CoPI, and it is practised with children as young as three years old. Also, children of all ages and abilities are able to participate together in CoPI. This means the teacher has to accept that all children have voice and that it is valued. Within Kate Wall. et al.’s notion of inclusivity, it is clear that everyone should have an equal voice. Of course, this is not only about the relationship between the adult and children in the context of CoPI but about all children within the dialogue and how they should have equal status and be able to participate to the same extent. The notion of having equal voice extends to considerations of power and the need for the facilitator to relinquish her power to enable the children’s voice, to recognize that their voice has value and that, in the context of the dialogue, this is not considered lesser than the adult facilitator’s. That is, there is an ethical element to one’s practice.

Diversity for Kate Wall and her colleagues is valued in considering inclusivity in the facilitation of children’s voice. In CoPI the facilitator welcomes and encourages diversity of views. She may do this in the stimulus she selects or in the question she chooses or in the way she selects speakers to take the dialogue forward. Diversity of views is what drives CoPI, and in promoting disagreement as well as agreement, this will flourish. Caution, of course, needs to be taken in suggesting that all views are welcome. Certainly, it is important to philosophical dialogue that a range of diverse views are explored, but some will be neither palatable nor acceptable, such as views that are racist, homophobic, or sexist, for example. The facilitator must consider how to facilitate voice with respect to such ideas without enabling such attitudes. She perhaps has to use her voice after
a dialogue to discuss some of these ideas, something the CoPI facilitator would otherwise avoid.

Beyond diversity of views, inclusivity is about ensuring that all have the opportunity to participate. In so saying, the facilitator of CoPI should work to ensure that those who may be marginalized are included in the dialogues (Chetty 2014; Reed-Sandoval and Sykes 2017; Chetty, Gregory, and Laverty, 2022). There is certainly evidence that those who are marginalized because of particular learning needs, behavioural challenges, and/or various other personal needs are able to participate in CoPI in the same manner as their peers without such needs (Cassidy et al. 2017; Cassidy et al. 2017; Cassidy and Heron 2018; Heron and Cassidy 2018). Indeed, for children for whom verbal contributions are challenging, the facilitator has to consider ways in which their participation may be supported. Perhaps symbols or cards with word/images might be used, or if the child is not fluent in the dominant classroom language, consideration should be given to how understanding may be promoted and voice facilitated, such as through using a translation app.

Questions teachers may ask themselves with respect to ensuring inclusivity through CoPI may include the following: How do I ensure that marginalized individuals have the opportunity to participate? How do I balance the notion of everyone having an equal voice with the need to drive the dialogue forward? How do I select stimuli from a range of worldviews to prompt dialogue? How do I reflect that all views are worthy of consideration but that some may challenge notions of inclusivity?

Listening

It seems obvious when speaking of voice, that someone will be listening or attending to that voice. This is not always the case when children and young people are concerned. CoPI accepts that children have something worth saying and that their views are given attention. These philosophical encounters should positively be sought (Johansson 2022). The facilitator’s role in CoPI centres around careful attention to what is being said during participants’ contributions and in their body language. One challenge for the CoPI facilitator is that she never validates or commends what has been said by a particular individual. Each contribution is valued, and the facilitator and participants recognize that one contribution cannot be made without building on others previously presented. Therefore, without praising individuals for their contributions, it is harder for the teacher as facilitator to demonstrate that she is listening and that what has been said—or not—matters.

However, there are times when she intervenes in the dialogue, and to do so she must listen conscientiously. At a simple level, the facilitator can intervene to ensure the rules are followed. More importantly, listening will allow the facilitator to intervene to ask for clarification on terms used, to request an example, or
to encourage a participant to elucidate or extend a point. The facilitator never rewords or reframes a participant's contribution in CoPI; rather, she pays close attention to what has been said to be able to ask a clear question to take the dialogue forward. Splitter (2016) asserts that good teachers will know how to stimulate curiosity and that the question posed will prompt participants to seek answers for themselves. For example, drawing on an extract of dialogue where children are exploring the existence (or not) of God (Cameron and Cassidy 2022, 182), one participant, Claris, says, “I disagree with Ellie because he’s [God’s] not really a living thing. In my opinion, if he does exist, he’s not really a living thing, but he is alive.” In response to this, the facilitator requests that Claris explains the distinction she’s making between being a living thing and being alive. In everyday conversations, Claris’ statement may have passed unnoticed, but here, the facilitator was listening carefully enough to encourage Claris to further both her thinking and that of her co-inquirers. She did not offer a view of her own but highlighted potential for further probing by posing a well-placed question.

In demonstrating careful listening, the facilitator models behaviour for the participants. Not only that, she removes any barriers to her listening to children’s voice (Haynes 2009). Counterintuitively, this may happen by putting in place a structure that facilitates voice and listening for the teacher and the participants. The structure of CoPI requires that participants listen because they must make explicit connections with what has been said previously. But to ensure the strongest possible dialogue, the facilitator has a responsibility to listen with care and with interest to what is being said. Such listening suggests that contributions are valued. In valuing and modelling this type of attention, it is anticipated that the children and young people will adopt a similar way of being when others express their voice.

Listening in this manner, one might posit, reaches beyond valuing what is said in a dialogue. It also acts as a sign of respect for what is being shared and for those who share. It suggests that the listener, in this instance the facilitator, takes seriously what is shared as part of the dialogue. It also generates a particular ethos within the classroom, something with which Haynes (2009) would agree when discussing ensuring classrooms are safe and respectful, where listening is a central feature and where children are able to share their thinking freely, knowing that it will be valued. If the children know that their teacher attends carefully to what they say, and they do the same, the general mood may be influenced, and a culture of mutual respect is likely. Indeed, a community reaching beyond the Community of Philosophical Inquiry is possible.

There are several questions the teacher as facilitator may ask when reflecting on her listening and how she promotes voice in her classroom, including the following: Do I listen equally to each contribution and each participant? In what ways do I demonstrate that I am listening and valuing contributions? How do I
respond to what I hear in the dialogue outwith the CoPI session? To what extent does listening to the children’s dialogue impact on me as an individual?

**Time and Space**

As Kate Wall et al. (2022) note, time and space can be physical and metaphorical. Here, they will be discussed in concrete, practical terms. Space, they suggest, is often construed as the classroom, the school building, the playground, while time manifests itself in the shape of timetables. They also highlight that space can be occupied or empty and that simply by being in a space does not mean that voice is supported or heard. Time, too, tends to be beyond children’s control, particularly in a classroom environment. This means if the teacher wishes to facilitate voice in the classroom through CoPI, she has to pay attention to time and space. She is immediately present (Johansson 2022) for the children and their dialogue.

One way in which we might consider time and space with respect to the teacher as facilitator of CoPI and children’s voice is to think of these in terms of opportunity. Reviewing what opportunities there are—what spaces and times—available to the teacher and to the children to allow for voice through CoPI becomes a central consideration. In several ways, engaging in philosophical dialogue through the likes of CoPI affords teachers the opportunity—the space and time—to foster and engage with children’s voice. Philosophical inquiry is not another subject to be crammed into an already full curriculum. Instead, it presents opportunities to engage with topics philosophically. Introducing new concepts or reflecting on ideas presented in the curriculum may benefit from philosophical exploration. This is to say that children, through philosophical dialogue, are able to express themselves in relation to the topic being examined. They can explore their ideas and understanding of the subject and reflect on their thinking in relation to this. The teacher provides opportunity for this by making time in the schedule and physically arranging the classroom for this to happen. She also accommodates the dialogue by enabling the activity to happen. This is seen, for example, in Cassidy and Heron’s (2018) work with young people in secure accommodation, where the young people report that they are surprised that young people that find themselves in such settings are able to think philosophically or that they do not get the chance to speak with one another about topics such as, “Should life [in prison] mean life?” or “Should you respect other people?” or “Is there an afterlife?” For such vulnerable young people in a very restricted space with very rigid timetables and rules, CoPI offered them the freedom and opportunity to express their thinking because the teacher provided the physical space and a dedicated time to do so.

Further, if time is not linear but cyclical (Wall K. et al. 2022), CoPI recognizes children as part of a wider system, part of the present and future, and their status is thereby enhanced. This is important in terms of enabling children’s
voice because it assumes a view of childhood where the forward momentum to adulthood is not the driving force. Instead, this view recognizes and acknowledges children *qua* children, and voice is valued. This perspective is one that the teacher adopts in CoPI, and it is one that Kate Wall and colleagues (2022) would commend as it allows that voice requires practice and that in so practising voice, one will be able to revisit one's thinking with a view to developing one's identity.

Classrooms are often places of division, where children work individually or with children that match their own so-called ability level. This diminishes opportunities for collaboration, particularly collaborative dialogue, that is inclusive of all. In adopting the likes of CoPI, the teacher welcomes opportunities for collaboration. Beyond this, she actively creates a physical space where children can come together at a specific time to explore their thinking together. The teacher as facilitator is sensitive to the need to ensure opportunities for children to come together physically in shared dialogue and that in creating a setting where children sit with and among others from their traditional groups and those outwith those groups, she positions voice as important in the children's lives and in her own life as a teacher, as an adult.

To this end, there is a series of questions the teacher may ask herself about voice in terms of time and space, including the following: *How do I create opportunities for philosophical dialogue in the planning of the curriculum? What opportunities do I offer the children to practise voice in the classroom? To what extent do I encourage children to work with different people in the classroom, within a CoPI session? In what ways might I physically organize my classroom to facilitate voice?*

**Approaches**

Kate Wall et al. (2019) argue that approaches to facilitating children's voice must be flexible and varied. They note that open dispositions are also likely to support voice (Cassidy et al. 2022). As Splitter (2010) explains, dispositions are what prompt or provoke particular behaviour, and this may relate to our inclinations, attitudes, or desires. Various dispositions are seen to be important for teachers should they be keen to promote philosophical dialogue—for example, openness, curiosity, responsiveness, and inquisitiveness (Splitter 2010; Johansson 2022). It is hoped that these dispositions are manifest by the teacher and the children. Kate Wall et al. (2019) suggest that such open and flexible approaches will engender participation. Of course, the dispositions of the teacher have to be as open as those they aim to foster in the young people. While CoPI has a set structure, as outlined above, it does not sit in isolation within the classroom. Adopting CoPI, which may be seen as inflexible due to its rule structure, is not the only activity the teacher will provide for the children with whom she works; she will offer a range of approaches and activities, of which CoPI is only one, that complement one another. It is worth saying, though, that although CoPI has a relatively rigid
structure, this structure is one that allows for freedom in making connections and expressing ideas. The structure provided supports the sharing of voice by ensuring that participants make connections to what they hear, think, and say. It may also act in such a way that those who tend to be more reticent in sharing their voice are afforded the security of the structure and may feel more confident in articulating their voice in CoPI.

The element of increased participation, or a link to action, is an interesting one. Certainly, Philosophy with Children generally would aim to align thought with action, and CoPI is no different. In this respect, the facilitator adopts an approach to stimulating and supporting voice in a manner in which reflective action is likely to follow (Lipman 2003; Cassidy 2007; McCall 2009; Di Masi and Santi 2015; Bartels et al. 2016). By providing participants with a range of philosophical topics to explore, the facilitator offers a range of instances when the children can move from the abstract of the dialogue to the more concrete element of living with others. The children, it is hoped, will reflect on what they hear, think, and say, and this will help them in making decisions about how they behave in society. And the more practised their voice is, the more likely they are to consider broader questions about how they live, which in turn helps them to have good judgement and participate in a way that is good for all.

If the teacher has already determined that she wishes to engage the children with whom she works in philosophical inquiry, she has a number of questions she may ask, including the following: How might CoPI complement the other activities I provide in the classroom? To what extent might the structure of CoPI support children’s voice? What dispositions am I hoping to foster in the children through CoPI, and which do I display? How can I be more explicit with the children about the connection between thought and action?

Processes

Cassidy et al. (2022) make a distinction between approaches and processes. While approaches relate to the choices an individual teacher might make, processes are concerned with the conditions and structures under which the teacher works that necessarily impact on the structures and conditions under which the children will work. Kate Wall et al. (2019) are clear that processes should welcome risk-taking and that they should work to offset an imbalance of power. Indeed, they advocate group dialogue as one way in which processes might support voice.

One thing that is important here is that risk-taking is encouraged for the teacher and the children. CoPI is a risky endeavour for teachers. For a start, the teacher cannot plan what is said during the dialogue; she responds to what the children contribute. In traditional classrooms, the teacher is in control, and control does not suggest risk-taking. In accepting that children will contribute in various ways and that they will share what they wish to share and not what is
wanted or even expected, the CoPI facilitator accepts the risk that she has to respond to the individuals and community engaged in the dialogue. She has to adopt an open-minded disposition and accept that she has to relinquish control in her classroom. This shifts the power dynamic, as Cassidy and her colleagues advocate.

It is worth noting that embracing philosophical dialogue with children means the teacher—the adult—is not only taking a risk but is accepting herself as not knowing, as being uncertain, as epistemically less privileged than might be the case in normal classroom contexts. In being disposed to curiosity, one might propose that the teacher will embrace uncertainty (Splitter 2016). The teacher has to be prepared for what may come when welcoming children's voice. The teacher, as Splitter (2016) explains it, will facilitate the dialogue and will create the conditions in which being unsettled or uncertain is desirable. The teacher may model this in her engagement with the dialogue, and this, continues Splitter, suggests to the children that she cares about their questions and inquiries and that she embraces her not knowing (Johansson 2022). Johansson (2022) talks about the teacher emptying herself, meaning she may acknowledge her experience and knowledge to enable her to hear what is being said but that she should not let this determine what is heard; the teacher seeks processes, structures, that allow this to happen. In so doing, she becomes aware of the possibilities for children's voice, leaving aside assumptions that may hinder this.

Beyond this, in adopting philosophical inquiry in the classroom, the teacher encourages the children themselves to take risks. She invites them to experiment with their thinking, usually out loud. This can be risky, partly because of children's interpersonal relationships and partly because they may not yet feel able to express their voice. In advocating this kind of risky behaviour in the classroom, the teacher is saying to the children, albeit implicitly, that risk is a good thing, that to express oneself, to share one's voice, can be risky, but risk-taking can be good if it aids understanding and dialogue and fosters respect.

This encouragement and acceptance of taking risks also enables the teacher to demonstrate that she has created a safe space in CoPI for this to happen. There will, of course, be structures within a school that suggest children are not necessarily as important as the adults in the same setting. If this is the case in school, it is magnified many-fold in wider society. CoPI offers children the opportunity to practise their voice in a safe context. The teacher has chosen an approach—CoPI—to employ with the children, and in so doing, she has created conditions that enable children's voice to be nurtured within the structures imposed on them and about which neither they nor an individual teacher have much control. Indeed, given the conditions under which many teachers and children work in schools, practising Philosophy with Children allows certain structures such as rigid timetabling, performativity, and narrow curricula to be offset. In some senses, CoPI offers the teacher a subversive way to engender children's voice.
The structure offered by CoPI can also be seen to allow for children’s voice in very tightly controlled spaces such as the secure accommodation in which some find themselves (Cassidy and Heron 2018; Heron and Cassidy 2018). Although the young people in the secure accommodation described in Cassidy and Heron’s project were bound by the confines of their imprisonment, individuals who would not otherwise come together in the setting engaged collaboratively in dialogue in ways in which they would not normally. For example, aside from the topics they wanted to explore, they quickly realized that while swearing was not tolerated in the setting under the usual circumstances, it was ignored in the context of the dialogues. This is important because the conditions and structures under which they lived and studied dictated immediate withdrawal from any situation where swearing was used. In the CoPI dialogues, the participants were able to use whichever vocabulary helped them to express themselves. They also, on occasion, participated in CoPI with their teachers. The setting’s structures, much like those in mainstream schools, generally do not see a group of children engaged in dialogue with their teachers on an equal footing. This kind of activity has the potential to alter the processes, the structures, and the conditions in which children—and their teachers—work.

In considering how she might work within the structures—the processes—in which she and the children find themselves in school, there is a range of questions the teacher may ask herself, including the following: To what extent do I encourage children to take risks in their thinking? In what ways might my practice suggest that I am willing to take risks to support children’s voice? How might CoPI challenge the structures within the school to enable children’s voice to be heard? What processes in the classroom, school, and society would benefit from listening more carefully to children’s voice?

Purpose

Cassidy et al. (2022) are clear that it is important to know why children’s voice is to be promoted. There are various reasons the facilitation of children’s voice may be seen as a good thing, including, as Cassidy et al. (2022) suggest, for consultation, evaluation, to help with planning, to advance democracy, or to effect some kind of change. Anderson (2020) correctly highlights the particularly adultist perspective that drives educational philosophy and practice. This is problematic and runs the risk of treating children as a means to an end, with that end being adult (Cassidy 2007). The same charge may be levelled at those wishing to promote children’s voice should children’s goals be ignored. One must know what one is trying to achieve through encouraging children’s voice, and this should be communicated, even if it is in an attempt to displace the traditional power structures to reposition children and adults in more positive relation. Cassidy et al. (2010) assert that children may initiate voice. Although CoPI follows a particular structure, as previously explained, this does not mean that children do
not initiate philosophical inquiry in the classroom. The teacher’s responsibility in such circumstances is to respond positively and welcome this move. One aspect of this may be to explore with the children what their purpose is in raising philosophical questions, particularly if this happens outwith a scheduled time for CoPI.

One thing that may be avoided in having an explicit rationale or purpose for introducing CoPI into the classroom is tokenism. Too often children are invited to share their views without care or consideration being given as to why this may be desirable; though, as noted previously, voice reaches further than an articulation of views. In understanding why she facilitates CoPI in the classroom, the teacher is being honest with herself and her pupils. She is suggesting an element of reciprocity that Kate Wall et al. (2019) would welcome. She is giving something of herself, her rationale, an explicit statement of her values, in order that children are freed to give something of themselves—their voice. In so doing, there is a sense that more authentic voice will be shared. The teacher will be more open, and the children will be more likely to share what they wish to share rather than what they think the teacher—the adult—wants to hear.

In considering her purpose in practising CoPI with the children with whom she works with the aim of supporting children's voice, the teacher might ask herself questions, including those that follow: *What do I hope to achieve through using CoPI as a means to facilitate children's voice? How do I communicate my purpose to the children? To what extent do I ensure a shared vision for children's voice through CoPI? How can I be sure that I am avoiding tokenism in practising CoPI with children?*

### Conclusion

If voice, as has been suggested above and through the likes of the UNCRC and the World Programme on Human Rights Education, is important, it is vital that practitioners take note and consider their practice. One way in which they might foster children's voice is through Community of Philosophical Inquiry, but it is important that they ask questions of themselves and their practice to ensure that what they are trying to achieve is clear to themselves and others, including the children with whom they work. In promoting voice through the likes of CoPI, it is not about satisfying the teacher’s goal (Splitter 2016; Anderson 2020); it is about recognizing children as agents that have the capacity to think for themselves. This will require particular behaviour on the part of the teacher and reflection on her practice. It will likely involve her in having pedagogical humility, as Johansson sees it, in order “to let the child make me [the teacher] small” (2022, 26). Acknowledging the adult/child binary and recognizing adult privilege and adultist perspectives so often present in society generally, and in classrooms specifically, will be important. To that end, this article has offered a series of questions upon which teachers might reflect. These are prompted by the
Look Who’s Talking project undertaken by Kate Wall et al. (2017; 2019; Cassidy et al. 2022). The flourishing of children’s voice is central to their project, and they offer seven factors—definition, power, inclusivity, listening, time and space, approaches, processes and purpose—that might be useful in helping practitioners think about the extent to which they support children’s voice and the ways in which they do this. These factors may be useful in affording consideration of CoPI and how it might enable children’s voice.

One thing is clear, as Conrad et al. (2015) note, children and young people are rarely afforded opportunities to explore their views, experiment with their thinking, and have others listen to and take their voice seriously. They often experience epistemic injustice by virtue of being children (Kennedy 2010; Murris 2013; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020). Paying attention, being present, and making an effort to identify and nurture children’s voices through philosophical dialogue (Haynes and Murris 2000) could allow for a more inclusive approach that fosters children’s voice and provides opportunities to the children—and the teacher—to shift the balance of power with the goal of the teacher actually listening to what is shared—or not—and ensuring that this in some way influences the status of children. Attention might usefully be paid to Anderson’s (2020) suggestion that the educational goals of children should be taken seriously, and this includes in their practice of philosophical inquiry. However, it is not sufficient that voice is expressed; Lundy (2007) is clear that “voice is not enough”; she insists that there must be space, audience, and influence if Article 12 from the UNCRC is to be successful.

Certainly, CoPI offers a space for voice to flourish, with the teacher and other participants being the audience. It is hoped, too, that the audience extends to those outwith the classroom. This may be achieved through finding spaces in which children might be listened to carefully and respectfully, in order that they have influence. This will require that their status and notions of their capacity are reconsidered (Hendrick 2000; Hammersley 2017; Cassidy and Mohr Lone 2020). Rather than “giving” children a voice (Bucknall 2014; Semenec 2018), what is proposed is that CoPI in the classroom supports children in developing their voice and that the teacher as facilitator needs to consider how her practice might impact on this goal.

References


A Brush with Discord: Discussing Cultural Relativism in Fifth-Grade Philosophy

By Jane Rutstein Shay

“Why is the world upside down?” a student asks. Others crane their heads to see the distorted northern hemisphere on the bottom. Above the couch in my classroom is my favorite world map, a political map of the world on which south is “up.”

“No, it’s just that the words are upside down,” says another student.

“Is it upside down?” I ask. “If the universe is expanding and vast, what does ‘up’ mean?”

“I think this is getting a little too philosophical for the first day of school,” the first student quips.

IN MY FIFTH-GRADE CLASSROOM, I WANT PHILOSOPHY TO BE AN EVERYDAY EXPERIENCE AND A PERIODIC DEEP DIVE. Practicing philosophical inquiry with children is different from the way the discipline is taught in higher education, but when done effectively, it provides a basis for critical thought, logical connection, and palpable wonder.

One quandary I experienced during my practice of doing philosophy with children involves issues of cultural relativism and the non-negotiables of ethical human conduct. In this reflection, I will delve into a specific moment in the classroom when the tension between the acceptance of diversity and understanding the breadth and variation of cultural practices sharply contradicted our tacit belief in agreed-upon moral norms. I will discuss the context and subtleties that arose as well as the responses of students and myself as the teacher in that moment. Finally, I will explore how engaging in philosophy with children is likely to hit snags like this but ultimately is worthy of our time and endeavor precisely because it creates dissonance without a clear answer.

This moment of discord came to the forefront during a social studies lesson about ancient civilizations, which evolved into a lesson and philosophical
discussion about cultural relativism. Embedded in our school culture is the value of teaching and fostering acceptance of diversity of all kinds. At the start of each academic year, we discuss our desire to create a school culture of respect, inclusion, and equity. We teach students to listen and disagree with kindness, the basics of civil discourse. But how will this hold up when cultural practices and norms contradict those essential values?

Last year, during a social studies lesson about ancient Mayan civilizations, students voiced various “ewws” and said “that’s gross” when we talked about Mayan foods and some cultural practices such as human sacrifice. Previously, we read The Code of Hammurabi, which clearly delineates worth based on gender and a strict social caste system. The students already knew that women were not citizens in ancient Athens and that enslaved people were part of almost every ancient culture we explored. Now, this knowledge appeared to bump up against our notion that all cultures are worthy of respect. It seemed like the perfect moment to examine our approach to history and other cultures. Should we curb our judgment of other cultures in the name of respect and acceptance?

Complicating the students’ reactions was the fact that one student, Emily (not her real name), grew frustrated by her peers’ reactions. She revealed that she had Mayan ancestry, and her classmates’ reactions disturbed her. That new material can elicit reactions of disgust isn’t unusual, but to Emily, her classmates’ reactions felt personal. After all, valuing human diversity is intertwined with understanding identity, a social/emotional issue paramount to children in young adolescence. I had to figure out how to honor Emily’s feelings and at the same time address the reactions of her classmates to cultural practices they perceived as discomfiting.

Doing philosophy with young students is different from teaching math. In the latter, problems are generated by the teacher, found in a textbook, or presented on a worksheet. There is a right and wrong answer. Our problem arose spontaneously, generated by Emily’s frustration and discomfort. Moments of discord like this can ultimately discourage some teachers from doing philosophy with young students. A philosophical conversation can go in innumerable directions; knowing when the teacher (or facilitator) must break the tacit bond of joint intellectual inquiry to “correct” a student’s misunderstanding is neither obvious nor exact. Students should wrestle with the conflict. Yes, respect for other cultures is essential to building peace and understanding, but still, we ponder if we can respect every aspect of other cultures.

Since we were learning about civil discourse and how to disagree with respect, I decided the class was ready for a challenge. Believing that Emily, in particular, was prepared and excited for this incitement, I devised a way to capture the energy of positive friction in our class. To focus on Emily’s frustration, I created a lesson in which I proposed a provocative statement: “Some cultures are more evolved than others.” Settling on a definition led to an interesting
discussion. Together, we defined “evolved” to mean “advanced.” Students, working in small groups, stated whether they agreed or disagreed with this definition and shared their position with their partners.

There was a variety of responses, but many defined an “advanced” culture as one in which technology was present. By doing so, they veered away from trying to quantify the more abstract “rightness” of a culture. Usually, I like to let students guide the direction of our study; however, I realized that we were skirting some more challenging topics. I did not want students to miss the big question mark that existed in the middle of a discussion of cultural relativism: the non-negotiables, particularly slavery, in both our American history and in many ancient civilizations, though it took different forms.

I then asked students to reflect on what they had learned about various ancient civilizations and to ask themselves which aspects they found specifically “disturbing.” What biases did they hold that made another culture sound strange or wrong? What values did they believe were non-negotiable? Where was the line between accepting differences and accepting something they thought was simply wrong? What practices could they not condone, no matter what the context was?

In my own mind, I was thinking of slavery, the degradation of the human condition. But the students surprised me. Some were alarmed and horrified by nudity. One student adamantly claimed that nudity was her “non-negotiable.” In her mind, breaking the behavioral norm of appearing clothed in public (i.e., being unclothed in public) was so heinous that she couldn't get past it; she couldn't consider another way to view this tradition.

I sat amid the tricky and problematic conflagration that our discussion had become. To me, nudity could never be as heinous as slavery, but I asked for a student’s opinion, and she provided it clearly. Despite my hesitation, I did not comment, correct, or contradict the girl’s statement; I knew our class time was nearly up.

Both the students and I departed the classroom questioning our own non-negotiables. If we had more time, perhaps we could have looked at the concept of nakedness from another angle or perhaps come up with a different example or deeper understanding of true human suffering. As adults we can smile at the notion that an eleven-year-old is horrified by nudity, reminding ourselves that in the mind of a young preteen who is focused on the notion of self and the trials of early puberty, the concept of nudity is prominent and dreadful. For the children in the particular demographics of our school, these issues are more top of mind than are the horrors human beings inflict on one another.

Later, I realized that this student’s intransigence perfectly demonstrated the slippery slope that might result from a discussion of “non-negotiables” during a lesson in cultural relativism. Realizing this did not disappoint me or make me feel resigned. The questions that arose during our discussion ended when class ended, but I trusted that the questioning would be revisited time and time again.
This persistence of questioning mirrors the discipline of philosophy itself. Just as long division cannot be mastered in a single class (or even a week of classes), a deep understanding of the nuances of cultural relativism cannot be understood in a class period. Given time, in future classes and because of their lived experience, students will have the opportunity to grapple with the pain of history and the complications of the human condition. In my fifteen years in the classroom, I have seen my fifth-grade students of past years become eighth-graders of the present who approach the world with different eyes and sparkling new critiques and context.

I already knew that engaging in philosophy in upper elementary and middle school opens both the students and teachers to reflect on thorny conceptions and misconceptions. As teachers we can correct some misconceptions in the moment, but some students will change their views only over time. As students grow, they will have more experience and gain the intellectual capacity to reassess beliefs they once held to come to new conclusions. What I hope will stay with my students is the notion that we can examine our beliefs through a critical lens and question our assumptions. If this approach stays with my students as they grow and develop, then the lesson was successful.

Teaching mental flexibility, the ability to change one’s beliefs when new information is presented or experience is acquired, is more valuable than providing an answer one way or another about cultural relativism. Providing a space for students’ voices, whatever problematic discussions ensue, is a more salient learning target than is the content itself.

Bibliography


About the Author

Jane Rutstein Shay, a fifth-grade teacher at the Evergreen School—a preschool through eighth-grade independent school in Shoreline, Washington—is also the school’s intermediate section coordinator and a debate team coach. Jane received her BA in philosophy from Tufts University and her MA in teaching from Seattle University.
Book Symposium

Thomas E. Wartenberg’s *Thinking Through Stories: Children, Philosophy, and Picture Books*

*By Thomas E. Wartenberg, Stephen Kekoa Miller, and Wendy C. Turgeon*

**Introduction**

*Thomas E. Wartenberg*

Mount Holyoke College

*THINKING THROUGH STORIES ORIGINATED IN MY DESIRE TO SUM UP MY BELIEFS ABOUT INTRODUCING YOUNG PEOPLE TO PHILOSOPHY THROUGH PICTURE BOOKS.* The book focuses on two main ideas: that children benefit from doing philosophy and that picture books are uniquely suited to encourage students to think philosophically.

I believe philosophy is important for children for many reasons, among them the following:

1) Doing so will produce more critical citizens, who are essential for a functioning democracy.
2) Children have genuine philosophical concerns that deserve to be taken seriously and discussed in their formal education.
3) Philosophical discussions provide children with a dispute-resolution procedure that they can employ in other situations.
4) Children are rarely asked for their opinions; doing philosophy can be an affirming experience, boosting their self-confidence.
5) Philosophy fosters inquisitiveness, which in turn nurtures a sense of wonder.

The advantage of using picture books to do philosophy with children is that the ensuing conversations are free of the cultural baggage usually associated with philosophical issues and discussions. So, when asked a question—such as “Do you think Frog and Toad are brave when they hide trembling in Toad’s house?”
(“Dragons and Giants” from *Frog and Toad Together* by Arnold Lobel) or “Do you think that the Boy was justified in asking the Tree to give him his trunk to build a ship?” (*The Giving Tree* by Shel Silverstein)—children engage with the philosophical ideas naturally. Picture books encourage children to think with a depth and seriousness belied by the books’ pleasant and amusing narratives and images.

Because I believed that the P4/wC (philosophy for/with children) community was more critical of using picture books than of using philosophical novels written expressly to facilitate philosophical discussions, I wanted to correct this imbalance by pointing out the advantages of using picture books and some problems associated with philosophical novels.

You’ll see these issues debated in the contributions to this symposium that follow.

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**Commentary**

**Stephen Kekoa Miller**  
Oakwood Friends School

TOM WARTENBERG HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS ONE OF THE LEADING WRITERS IN THE FIELD OF P4/wC, INFLUENCING ITS PRACTICE AROUND THE WORLD. I really enjoyed his most recent book, *Thinking Through Stories*. It goes well beyond other books about P4/wC—most of which introduce the idea of picture book philosophy to those unfamiliar with it—by directly confronting some of the most important areas of disagreement among practitioners of P4/wC and precollege philosophy.

The book raises interesting questions about how graphic novels, pictures, and memes might serve both as prompts for doing philosophy and as philosophical works themselves. I recommend this book, especially because it takes on some of the most pressing and important issues educators face today. I raise a few concerns about the section on using picture books to handle discussions of race, concerns that have inspired some really useful conversations and to which Wartenberg responds below. I also highlight a few other sections that really resonated with me. There was much of great interest that I don’t have space to discuss, but this is all the more reason to read *Thinking Through Stories*, which inspires thinking and conversation.
Can Picture Book Philosophy Handle the Topic of Racism?

*Thinking Through Stories* responds at length to Darren Chetty’s influential article, “The Elephant in the Room: Picture Books, Philosophy for Children and Racism.” Wartenberg particularly takes on the contention that philosophical picture books are abstract and thus divorced from racism’s social and historical context. Chetty is concerned that books that lack context about structural, legal, and intentional racism may lead children, particularly White children, who are more likely to be unaware of the history or social frame, to inevitably misunderstand racism, especially structural racism, and to instead view it as simply individual failing.

Wartenberg argues that some philosophical children’s books do in fact offer some context to their presentation of racism. My question is not whether we can provide young students with the historical background to contextualize institutional racism, but how we can accomplish this through Community of Inquiry (CoI) without violating the core value of open dialogue. As well, what criteria should be used to decide which books are effective at doing this kind of philosophy with children?

Next, Wartenberg extensively discusses *Tusk Tusk*, the picture book Chetty analyzes at length. On its first page, *Tusk Tusk* introduces two elephants, one white and one black. Chetty worries that using elephants in this way, as a stand-in for White and Black people, abstracts the idea of racism from its actual historical context and fails to provide appropriate context, which could lead some children to attribute differences to personal failing, as explained above. However, in *Thinking Through Stories*, Wartenberg compellingly reinterprets the story, suggesting that it is better understood as about war, rather than race. It’s an interesting take on the book, but leaves me wondering whether children would interpret the book this way. It seems that children would be alert to the racial aspect to the story. If children are alert to the racial aspect, then a facilitator would have to work hard to turn the discussion away from race and toward conflict—which seems to violate the very spirit of doing philosophy with children: allowing them to guide the discussion.

Third, I am concerned about the goal of a P4/wC session. In the dialogues that conclude with *aporia* or perplexity rather than an affirmative answer to topics he pursues—such friendship, love, truth, and justice—Socrates seems to claim that discussions should not begin with an answer in mind. However, in some contexts, such as law school, professors use Socratic questioning to reach a predetermined destination. *Thinking Through Stories* rightfully rejects this as an aim for a CoI: “In addition, [children’s] motivation for taking part in the discussion is thought to depend on their seeing the outcome of the discussion as one that is determined by them and not the adults supervising their interactions” (Wartenberg 2022, 47). However, what happens when a CoI session about real and serious social issues—racism, sexism, ableism, ageism—violates the norms
of such a discussion or of an ethical school? That is, how can teachers as facilitators conduct open-ended dialogues that may enter statements or questions that would not be considered ethically acceptable? A related question: should facilitators participate in discussions, and if so, to what extent?

Turning to my last concern with the book’s discussion of racism and picture books, Thinking Through Stories convincingly argues that there are good texts that suggest how facilitators can engage in conversations about racism. Wartenberg persuasively suggests that it is not only possible, but in fact valuable for nonprofessionals or non-trained philosophers to facilitate CoI discussions with children.

However, I need to voice an uncomfortable fact. For years I have served as a faculty mentor to new teachers and, as department chair, evaluated teachers. I know that texts are important. So is preparation. However, unquantifiable variables like personality and demeanor matter enormously. A person ill suited to facilitating CoI can dampen a room full of eager kids and squelch even the best questions or discussions that arise from reading the best picture books. Even discussions that may seem low-stakes, such as those involving aesthetics or metaphysics, can end up being racially and sexually inflected. When the stakes are higher—when the conversation is about race, morality, gender, sexual orientation, or disability—unskilled moderators, though experienced, well credentialed, and licensed, can inflict real harm. To me, this presents a virtue issue: not all potential moderators possess the right virtues to do the task well.

**Issue of Interpretation for Picture Books**

*Thinking Through Stories* demonstrates a lovely existentialist reading of the classic book *Rainbow Fish*. This, combined with the above discussion of how the book *Tusk Tusk* can/should be read, prompted me to think about interpretation and picture books. I agree with Wartenberg that it is best not to attempt to figure out the authors’ intentions: “Rather than asking what the creator of a picture book might have had in mind, as one does when one reads ‘with the grain,’ or what an author might not have been able to acknowledge about the text, which is the basic question of readings ‘against the grain,’ a philosophical discussion focuses on the ideas or concepts at issue in a book or discussion . . . ” (Wartenberg 2022, 89). In discussing *Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery*, though, Wartenberg refers to Lipman’s pragmatism. Although this helps us see where Lipman shows his inconsistency, it would violate basic principles of a CoI if a facilitator guided the discussion by bringing up information about the author or the context of the book in order to help children reach a particular conclusion.

**Self-Esteem and P4/wC**

Wartenberg’s claim that doing P4/wC can help improve a child’s self-esteem is particularly moving. This section of his book may also be useful in convincing
someone of the value of doing philosophy with children without pointing to the
tired trope of improved test scores. Wartenberg’s narratives about self-esteem
and philosophy for children coincide with my experiences of working with
(mostly) older children. Philosophy often allows them to feel seen and heard
in ways that other subjects simply do not. I especially notice students’ reactions
when I tell them that they brought up points that I have never considered in texts
that I’ve taught for years. Even those students who didn’t offer insights feel that
something special is happening.

At these moments, I believe the students experience self-esteem in a genu-
ine way, since in doing philosophy, they are able to be epistemically equal to
their teachers for the first time. Keep in mind Matthews’s persuasive conten-
tion that younger people are actually better at thinking counterfactually—about
“what-if” rather than “what-is” (Matthews 1996). As a result, offering students
the experience of having access to counterfactual knowledge that their teachers
and parents don’t have anymore can go a long way toward helping to reduce the
epistemic injustice that they feel from day to day in classes.

Children as Philosophers Despite Having No Training

Wartenberg mentions the (almost risible) plan Socrates discusses in the Republic
focusing on how and when people should begin studying philosophy: they’d
need to be thirty-five years old, with years of training in numerous other fields.
The book then dismisses this approach by referring to Plato’s metaphysics, which
Wartenberg rightfully suggests almost no one now accepts. We don’t need to
adopt Plato’s metaphysics, however, to take seriously his concern that “I don’t
suppose that it has escaped your notice that, when young people get their first
taste of arguments, they misuse it by treating it as a kind of game of contradic-
ton. They imitate those who’ve refuted them by refuting others themselves, and,
like puppies, they enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their argu-
ments” (Republic VII 539ab).

Is there merit to the concern that students with a little bit of philosophy
practice will become irritating, diminishing the ability of other teachers to teach
their subjects? As one of my seventeen-year-old students, Shakiba, put it, “A half-
baked philosophy student will live in melancholy and distress because she will
be able to find everything wrong with the world but won’t be able to make sense
of it.” This brings me to a final thought. Throughout the book, Wartenberg talks
about the central role wonder plays in doing philosophy with children. It’s good
to remember that some of that wonder contains a moral force: children wonder
at our apparent failure to repair the wrongs they see around them. Letting them
express that is also a core component of doing philosophy with children.

To conclude as I began, this consideration indicates how essential it is to
offer children the space to explore the kind of wonder that also includes anger
and moral judgment. *Thinking Through Stories* is a great resource to help us start to sort through all these issues. I highly recommend it!

### References


### Commentary

**Wendy C. Turgeon**  
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This book, divided into three main sections, makes a strong case for using picture books to encourage philosophical reflection. First, Wartenberg presents an argument that doing philosophy with young people is valuable; second, he strongly defends using picture books rather than specifically written philosophical novels and explains how these picture books are philosophical; and third, he lays out some guidelines for novices to follow and closely examines some contentious issues for discussion, such as racism and morality. He offers an accessible guide to using picture books that will be attractive to teachers, parents, and anyone who lives or works with young children. And his arguments for using picture books
are ones that I have used myself. However, I disagree on a couple of points: his insistence that picture books should replace the crafted philosophical novel, and his optimism that anyone can facilitate a philosophical dialogue.

In the first section, Wartenberg presents cogent reasons that philosophy with young people can be so important intellectually, socially, and emotionally, reasons on which we clearly agree. Wartenberg’s book quickly pinpoints a major misconception, namely, that “There are no right or wrong answers in philosophy.” Many beginning P4/wC practitioners confuse open-ended questions and responses with expressions of opinions or feelings. The author points out that there are many wrong answers and suggests instead focusing on proposing better answers and supporting arguments. Yes, participants in a philosophical discussion should leave with some sense of progression. Reaching resolution or consensus isn’t the only goal; progress can be couched in the classic realization of Socratic ignorance.

In chapter two, the author cites three key values of doing philosophy with young people. Enhancing their sense of self has always been central to the practice, going back to Lipman’s early video on P4C, “Socrates for Six-Year Olds.” Wartenberg correctly acknowledges that children feel affirmed when they are asked for their opinions and feel heard by adults. Second, he reaffirms the claim that children are natural philosophers. Since Gareth Matthews and Matthew Lipman (among many) argued this point in the 1980s, everyone in the field has accepted that children, like philosophers, are curious, willing to ask questions, open to perplexity, and comfortable with ambiguity as many adults are not. But there are people for whom his message will be fresh and will challenge their assumptions that children are incapable of “abstract thinking.” Third, the author echoes the argument of Lipman and others that by doing philosophy children learn civil discourse skills—to listen, think, and speak respectfully—that help them resolve conflicts in other arenas of their lives.

Throughout his second section, Wartenberg claims that picture books can challenge cultural beliefs and question assumptions about bravery, beauty, and values. He also offers many analyses of picture books: *Where the Wild Things Are*, *The Important Book*, and his favorite Frog and Toad story about bravery, for example. But he also suggests that picture books are not only superior to Lipman’s philosophical novels, but that the novels should be avoided. I take issue with this radical stance. Granted, the later Lipman novels are better than the early ones (which nearly everyone agrees need updating). As well, using books already in a classroom or home library is easier and may fit more seamlessly into a classroom curriculum. But Wartenberg too quickly dismisses the values of Lipman’s novels and manuals or seems to misunderstand their function. They can offer invaluable support for novice facilitators; additionally, they were never intended to serve as four-hundred-page lesson plans, as he seems to suggest.
Contrary to Wartenberg’s claims, transcripts of children discussing Lipman’s novels show that the characters in the stories serve as discussant models. Each story (especially those after Harry Stottlemeyer’s Discovery) offers a wide range of potential philosophical issues, not just one theme, as he claims. Even if each has an overarching theme—nature and perception in Kio and Gus, identity and classification in Pixie, ethics in Lisa—I disagree that this feature limits the range of philosophical ideas the books raise, especially since Wartenberg appears to adopt the same strategy, flagging picture books according to the main abstract concept each highlights. At the end of chapter four, he briefly admits these points himself.

He then introduces an intriguing point. A facilitator exploring the concept of “some are/some are not” can point out that the logic of ordinary language can lead to a different interpretation than that of formal logic. This could be a great opportunity to highlight how formal logic works and how it can and can’t be used in everyday language—a distinction, Wartenberg underscores, that may escape a facilitator’s notice. But that is true for many philosophical issues that arise and articulates the second of my reservations with his argument: namely, that one needs no background or training in philosophy to facilitate a philosophical discussion.

Wartenberg insists that in the hands of an experienced facilitator, using picture books to prompt discussion unlocks great philosophical potential. I agree. I am less sanguine that teachers who have been through a regimented educational system driven by outcome-based models can easily prompt the same high level of philosophical thinking and discussion that Wartenberg himself demonstrates. I concur that teachers need not have majored in philosophy, but they do need to be acquainted with philosophical methods, questions, and range to hear the philosophical underpinning of a student’s casual comment. This acquaintance would also help them take better advantage of Wartenberg’s website and other resources, which could otherwise prove challenging to use in the classroom. Pointing out available resources may not prepare teachers or parents to actually do philosophy with children.

For example, chapter six focuses on Arnold Lobel’s “Dragons and Giants” and the questions it raises involving bravery: Can brave people be also afraid? Are brave people ever afraid? Can we tell if people are brave by looking at them? This story does philosophy by making a philosophical claim and then presenting a counterexample. Yet this excellent chapter poses a serious question: how many novice philosophy facilitators could offer Wartenberg’s careful and nuanced analysis?

Wartenberg masterfully zeroes in on philosophical conundrums. Facilitators under the tutelage of someone like Wartenberg can learn it, yes. However, most teachers who attend a workshop on developing a “community of inquiry” or are directed to resource-rich websites on prompting philosophical discussions
may not be adequately prepared for the immediacy of doing philosophy in the classroom; neither will they be able to satisfy a principal asking for the learning outcomes of their philosophy lessons. This is not their fault. In the educational landscape today, teachers are afforded little time to explore ideas but are pressured to teach to the tests.

Chapter seven offers very helpful guidelines on how to lead a discussion using a picture book. Wartenberg outlines his key criteria that need to be met for a discussion to be called “philosophical,” emphasizing that it must move beyond facts or empirical claims to explore abstract concepts. This is very helpful and some newcomers “get it” quickly. But appreciating and developing a “philosophical ear” can take time and intensive preparation, and that can prove a stumbling block.

Wartenberg also offers excellent suggestions for using picture books based on real-life stories to encourage children to reflect on important issues, tackling two especially challenging areas: race and morality. I concur that books about race, criteria of difference and culture, and morals must be chosen carefully and examined as contestable concepts. Exploring options, how we treat—and ought to treat—one another, reasons for differences, and the need to give reasons can prepare even young children to question racism and sexism. Wartenberg recounts a debate between Darren Chetty and Karin Murris about *Tusk Tusk*, a picture book featuring black and white elephants (Wartenberg 2022, 90–91). Although I think Murris has the stronger position, I don’t deny Chetty’s genuine concern that the book may present a glib and facile take on racism. He is correct to be concerned.

I wonder if it is more advantageous to use books about animals to prompt discussions of complex issues. These do not explicitly critique children’s parents and relatives but rather focus us on the abstract and very lived concepts of justice, criteria for difference, and issues of fairness. Although I somewhat disagree with Wartenberg’s claim that books dealing with real events provide better discussion prompts, we agree that many approaches are valid. I also embrace his conclusion that we can draw from a range of methodologies, including thought experiments, discussions based on news and current events, and even philosophical novels. Some practitioners—Peter Worley or Catherine McCall—have a much more rigorous or structured system for encouraging philosophy discussion than does Wartenberg.

In summary, this as a valuable guide for doing philosophy with children. Wartenberg offers an engaging argument for doing philosophy and clear guidelines on how to have a discussion. However, he may be too optimistic about how easy it is to implement a philosophical discussion for those without some background knowledge. Inexperienced facilitators may give up on philosophy as confusing and pointless rather than seek more training. Although I fully support the use of picture books, I think that well-crafted philosophical novels, along
with well-developed “manuals” or guides, can also prompt excellent discussions, perhaps even better than picture books.

References

Response
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WENDY TURGEON AND STEPHEN MILLER APPROACH THEIR CRITIQUES OF THINKING THROUGH STORIES DIFFERENTLY AND RAISE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES. I will begin my response by discussing the question of whether philosophical novels or picture books are more appropriate to use for P4/wC discussions, arguing that there are issues with philosophical novels that have not adequately been raised. I will then defend picture books against the criticism that there are certain subjects, such as race and racism, that they cannot adequately address. Finally, I will respond to the criticism that I have minimized what a facilitator needs in order to facilitate a P4/wC discussion successfully.

Picture books or philosophical novels? Phrasing the issue in this way assumes the dyadic model Turgeon claims I employ. That is not the case, however. My concern was to raise some issues with the use of philosophical novels in P4/wC that I believe were not adequately discussed by the community. Let me explain.

In criticizing the use of philosophical novels, I focus on a problem I discovered with Lipman’s first philosophical novel, Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery, one that I was surprised hadn’t been raised before.

Here’s a brief account of the problem. Turgeon points out that “the characters in [Lipman’s] stories serve as discussant models.” Because that’s true, Harry’s attack on his friend Maria is problematic because it replicates something that
Miller reminds us Plato saw so long ago: that young people who have just discovered philosophy “like puppies . . . enjoy dragging and tearing those around them with their arguments.”

When Harry didactically shows Maria that her claim that some of the classes in this school must be interesting, since some of them are boring, he ignores the pragmatics of how people use language. Contra Turgeon, I have nothing against the use of logic to analyze language, but I do object to applying it in the wooden and aggressive way Harry does when he mansplains to Maria what she gets wrong.

I have to admit that I don’t know how often philosophical novels involve scenarios as problematic as this. Turgeon believes that Lipman’s later novels are better, although she doesn’t supply an example. Still, Lipman’s depiction of Harry is worrying, precisely because young people—especially, I’m afraid, young boys—will do exactly what Turgeon says they will, viz., use the behavior engaged in by characters like Harry as models for their own behavior.

The problem I have pointed to in Harry raises the more general question that Miller poses in his comments: how can we assure ourselves that teaching young children the basics of philosophy won’t result in their becoming young terrors, accosting their friends with their new-found skills? Although I don’t have a panacea, I think we need to remember that when we work in what is widely called a community of philosophical inquiry, we are not teaching children philosophical skills one-on-one but rather in a group setting in which they learn appropriate ways to interact with one another. This method of teaching provides a corrective to the tendency of young Socrateses to accost their own Euthyphros to disastrous effect.

Picture books have been subject to more criticism than philosophical novels within the P4/wC community. For example, a great deal of attention has been given to Darren Chetty’s criticism of picture books as unsuitable to teach children about racism because they lack the historical context necessary for understanding it. Miller discusses my response to Chetty, pointing out that I present two responses.

My first response is that one of the books Chetty mentions, Tusk Tusk, is not about race but war. I now think that was not the appropriate way to respond. As Miller points out, children may still think it’s a book about race. A more adequate response begins by asking what the book is actually about. I see the book as raising this issue: Why does one group of people feel a need to disparage another group, a need that eventually leads them to fight those others and, though the book does not mention this, even enslave them? This is a more abstract question than that of the origins of racism, but it is relevant to that issue.

For a philosophical guide to this issue, I suggest turning to Hegel, who focuses on this in the “Lordship and Bondage” section of The Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel theorizes that members of one group experience members of
another group who differ from them in some way as a threat to their self-concept. They believe—falsely, as it turns out—that the appropriate way to restore their self-assurance is to diminish, disparage, subordinate, and even enslave members of the other group. This is an existential analysis of the origins of inequality and also, by extension, racism.

Remarkably, I see the simple picture book *Tusk Tusk* as focused on this issue. Of course, I wouldn't expect a second—or even fifth-grader to respond to the book by developing anything like Hegel's account. But I think that it would be beneficial to ask them, “Why do the big-eared elephants look at the small-eared elephants with suspicion?” I would expect the children might respond, “Because they are different from them,” and that could lead to a very important discussion about whether it is reasonable to see someone who is different from you as either superior or inferior.

My second response to Chetty involves two picture books that do present historically informed discussions of racism. Here, I’ll only discuss *Separate Is Never Equal: Sylvia Mendez & Her Family’s Fight for Desegregation*, by Duncan Tonatiuh. This book gives the history of the court battle that was an important precursor to *Brown v. Board of Education*. While not contesting that this book satisfies Chetty’s concern, Miller asks whether using such a book will undermine the P4/wC commitment to having genuine dialogues rather than teaching children what to think. “Could a teacher be expected to view a segregationist point of view as equally valid to an integrationist one?” I imagine him asking.

That’s a fair point. It’s not easy to teach a book like this, especially when you want to avoid didactically teaching its content, despite the importance for students to learn that. Teachers have to open the discussion with a question on which there can be two sides. So they might ask the students whether they think parents should risk everything in order to right a wrong, as the Mendezes did. That’s a challenging issue on which the Mendezes took a courageous stand and one about which there can be genuine disagreement that one would expect to take place in a classroom.

I can imagine Turgeon using my response to raise a question about facilitation, the next topic I want to discuss. “Without more training,” she might ask, “could a teacher reasonably be expected to realize what question is an appropriate one for opening a discussion of *Separate Is Never Equal*?”

The issue of what preparation is necessary for philosophical facilitators is a vexatious one. Turgeon is critical of my claim that teachers can find resources that will help them learn to facilitate in books like mine as well as materials available on the web. Despite praising my analyses of stories like “Dragons and Giants,” she argues that my interpretations show that it takes philosophical sophistication to understand the philosophical points embedded in a very simple story. Her own response is to claim that what it takes is having a “philosophical ear,” that is, the ability to hear when an issue is philosophical.
If I accept Turgeon’s claim for argument’s sake, the issue of what is necessary for a teacher to acquire a philosopher’s ear remains unanswered. Miller is not sanguine about whether taking courses on doing P4/wC will succeed in creating good facilitators. He claims that it is really a question of individual virtue and, rather surprisingly, that this is not something that can be taught.

I don’t claim to have solved this problem. But I do think that my claim that books like my own as well as web resources like my site, teachingchildren philosophy.org, can be as effective as taking courses. There are more resources in both books and websites than Turgeon acknowledges.

Ideally, of course, I think we all agree that a teacher would need to be reasonably acquainted with philosophy as well as classroom management issues to be a successful facilitator. But not many teachers have the requisite philosophical knowledge, although most have the necessary classroom skills. I think we are all trying to see what works best to give teachers the knowledge they need to become successful facilitators, given that they can’t be expected to have an MA in philosophy as well as an MEd.

In closing, I thank Turgeon and Miller for their insightful and challenging comments. I hope I have gone some way toward continuing the dialogue they began.

References


We live in an age during which we have begun to ask questions about the quality and integrity of our public discourse and the way we debate those issues that are of central importance, both to living together well as human beings and to our survival on our fragile planet. We do not need to look far into our politics to recall the rhetoric of figures such as Donald Trump in the US and Boris Johnson in the UK, or into the role of the so-called social media “influencers,” to sense the urgency of these questions.

This impressive and wide-ranging volume addresses the very different ways that engagement with the public through different forms of public philosophy can address the state of our public discourse and, in the words of one contributor to the volume, “bring serious thought to all sorts of people” (Morris 2022, 21). Organized into five parts, the volume begins by considering the place of public philosophy and how we might think of the term “public philosophy,” since it resists easy definitions. Also included is an assessment of its value and its problems (part 1, chapters 1–5).

The volume is rooted in distinctly North American understandings of public philosophy (the overwhelming majority of its forty-eight contributors having strong connections with the United States). The chapters give a strong sense that the rationale for academic philosophers (in the main) to develop work in public philosophy is related to a concern for “the development of philosophy in public venues (such as political addresses, speeches at public conventions, public debates, as well as opinion pieces in newspapers and other popular periodic publications)” (Gallegos-Ordorica 2022, 83). In doing this the contributors argue that public philosophy can address public problems (Wildcat 2022, 95), thus “sensitizing the culture to flawed reasoning or persistent biases” (Schoonover 2022, 229); move philosophy closer to the “real” world outside the academy (Allen 2022, 359); and, in short, can “create space in public discourse for humble, self-critical, reflective thought: to encourage passionate but civil discourse; to engender a love for ideas and thinkers that have shaped our global culture; and to demonstrate how understanding these ideas can open us up to new and exciting futures” (Cashio 2022, 212).
These aims for public philosophy play out in part 2 (chapters 6–19), which considers the wide range of different locations for, and the impact of, such work. Here the volume reflects not only on public philosophy rooted in Latinx, Africana, and indigenous traditions but also exposes how much public-engagement work in philosophy is related to different forms of activism (protest and epistemic activism, climate and environmental activism, peace activism, food activism, and trans activism, for example). This part of the volume also addresses important questions about the outcomes of public philosophy. In our contemporary universities, the concern about the wider impact of academic work and research continues to dominate much of the discourse. Yolonda Wilson, in discussing her work in feminist bioethics (part 2, chapter 6), does not draw a distinction between her work and the impact it has; rather, she describes her work in this field as public practice (2022, 55). In a similar vein, Joseph Stramondo writes of what he calls the “duty” to do public philosophy (around issues of disability during a pandemic), justifying this with the claim that the forces guiding motivating actions in public philosophy are roundly “other regarding” (2022, 67).

The impressive breadth of this volume (and therefore its appeal to academic philosophers working across philosophical traditions and interest areas) is shown most fully in part 3 of the volume (chapters 20–31) in which some of the modalities for public philosophy work are laid out. Although some of these are more easily called to mind given their affordances for public engagement and dialogue (the radio, generalist and specialist public lectures, podcasts, philosophical spaces that elicit philosophical reflection), others are emerging areas of innovation for public philosophy (fantasy comedy television series, philosophical counseling). The scope of this work, and its potential to lay down a challenge to philosophy (sometimes thought to be grappling with its relevance to different publics), is not insignificant. It is, in many senses, a well-considered response to the famous line by the nineteenth-century American Transcendentalist philosopher and essayist Henry David Thoreau when he wrote (as McIntyre notes, p. 6), “There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers” (Thoreau 1854/1999, 15).

Building on the impressive range of modalities for public philosophy in the third major part of the volume, part 4 (chapters 32–38) turns the reader’s attention to those groups with whom public philosophers choose to engage. Examples of these collaborators include children, those who are incarcerated, activists, governments and NGOs, healthcare ethics panels, and industry. These chapters again draw attention to important, yet overlooked, questions in the growing literature on public and community forms of philosophy. Specifically, how does the academy prepare its faculty staff for such public engagements, and how is access to such diverse communities facilitated? Anita Allen argues that the academy plays a lesser role in such important preparatory work to develop expertise in public engagement (despite its growing emphasis on the impact agenda) and
that much of the necessary interdisciplinary capability needed to do public philosophy well arises from opportunities outside formal degree training programs (Allen 2022, 362). Indeed, Patrick Lin addresses one aspect of this gap head-on, advising those aspiring to public philosophy to work on the ground rules of public and media relations. The thorny issue of access to potential collaborators is also addressed, though more implicitly, in this part. Allen writes of the public philosopher as “getting close” (2022, 368), but we get only a glimpse of some of the associated difficulties with this kind of work (notably in Michael Ray’s account of how Nancy McHugh was banned from entering the London Correctional Institution for her public philosophy writing group work with prisoners [Ray 2022, 344]).

In his foreword to *A Companion to Public Philosophy*, Jason Stanley writes that the contributors’ essays amount to “a wide and variegated field report from philosophers who have successfully engaged various publics” (2022, xix). He notes that the volume opens onto a series of important questions: How do philosophers address a public, and what is the history of their various attempts? How should we think of what constitutes “public philosophy” and who should be engaged in this task? He concludes that the essays in the *Companion* show that “reflection on the topic of public philosophy raises thorny philosophical issues about what it is to practice philosophy, and hence questions about what is constitutive of being a philosopher” (2022, xx). There is much to be admired in the volume for the way that these questions are addressed. The reader is offered detailed, persuasive, rich, and original accounts of the breadth and importance of public philosophy understood in the sense of (academic/professional) philosophers bringing their thinking to the public and opening up “broader avenues of conversation between philosophers and the public” (Cashio 2022, 212).

But perhaps there is more work to do than this particular volume achieves in thinking about who the public philosopher is, or might be. Noëlle McAfee expresses what seems to underlie many of the contributions in the volume: that philosophers have a tendency to approach public philosophy work as “experts and edifiers, with the aim to correct and improve the public” (2022, 135). This is at odds with her own approach of “eschewing the views of the philosopher as expert and the public as deficient . . . [and] imagining new ways for philosophy to act in partnership with democracy” (ibid.). Similarly, Massimo Pigliucci’s account describes the use of the Socratic method for public philosophizing about the good life and offers a more expansive view of public philosophy (2022, 110). However, the idea of the public themselves as philosophers in their own right (though often untrained in academic philosophy) is only touched on in this volume, though it is central to the idea of community philosophy. As Grace Lockrobin notes elsewhere, “It is not the location alone that determines whether philosophical work in these [community] contexts constitutes Community Philosophy. What is fundamental here is the idea of the community participating as philosophers” (2020,
Although other related works offer an arguably stronger account of community philosophy, this volume includes original and distinctive reflections from the field about opening up thinking directed at other academic philosophers on what it means to practice public philosophy.

The final part of the volume offers a hopeful account of the possibilities of public philosophy going forward. The fact that these concluding sections begin to point to the troubling philosopher/non-philosopher dichotomy and demand a rethinking of the job of philosophy in terms of “a set of tools that are used to engage the world” (McHugh 2022, 429) is a testament to this hope.

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References


How would society and children benefit if children were appreciated as original, sophisticated thinkers who make meaningful contributions to the understanding of the world? Rejecting the common assumption that children are immature thinkers, Jana Mohr Lone's *Seen and Not Heard* shows that children are indeed capable of philosophical contemplation. Lone, co-founder and director of PLATO (Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization), has facilitated philosophical inquiries among and with children for over twenty-five years. This book focuses on her experiences with children between the ages of five and twelve as a Philosophy for Children (P4C) practitioner and includes remarkable excerpts from her discussions with them.

Lone's book consists of seven chapters that are well organized into three main parts: (1) a diagnosis of the phenomenon in question—the ignorance regarding children's philosophical thinking abilities, (2) evidence of children's power as sophisticated thinkers, and (3) a proposed solution for this phenomenon. First, Lone introduces the problem at hand—children not being heard—and traces its origin back to the traditional conception of childhood by engaging with a large body of philosophical, educational, and sociological studies. Starting with Gareth Matthews's critique of the deficit conception of childhood (Matthews 2008, 27), Lone argues that the traditional understanding of childhood as a stage of development prompts adults to treat children as unreliable, unsophisticated conversation partners. She notes that even when a child makes a thoughtful comment or observation, an adult usually dismisses it as “cute,” rather than taking the remark seriously. Lone connects this type of ageism with epistemic injustice. People of all ages, Lone argues, are in the process of becoming, and, therefore, children's thoughts should be respected just as those of adults are.

Next, Lone cites short excerpts from discussions among children that the author observed and facilitated. She also offers her analysis of the children's remarks, emphasizing their capability of engaging in philosophical conversations. Themes discussed include childhood, friendship, politics, happiness, and death. Lone begins each chapter with several philosophical quotations, including one sophisticated remark expressed by one of the children. This ingenious device
invites readers to consider these young philosophers’ thoughts as seriously as they do the remarks of adult thinkers. Throughout these chapters, Lone provides an “impressionistic account” (28) that focuses on the thoughts of a small group of children she observed and on the ways their thoughts have expanded her own views. Lone explicitly says that her account does not aim to make final claims about the children’s beliefs but to illustrate what they might mean. This methodology might raise concerns about the accuracy of the representation of children, but Lone seems to refrain from stating what the children believe on their behalf. Rather, she focuses on philosophical insights we can get from children once we change our attitudes toward them.

The three chapters that focus on childhood, politics, and death, respectively, play an especially important role in her argument. After offering her analysis of the traditional misconception of childhood, Lone attempts to hear from children, which is what she asks of her readers. Chapter 2, “Childhood,” shows how the children themselves think both about childhood and about their status as original thinkers. Lone, here, nicely exemplifies herself as a good listener—she hears what children have to say about their power as thinkers, instead of providing her own account of children's philosophical thinking. A group of ten-year-olds argues that they possess more creativity, more imagination, stronger curiosity, deeper authenticity, and more openness than adults. They also claim that these traits often help them make better decisions than adults. Having heard the children’s voices, Lone confirms their claims through her observations of their exchanges. For instance, Lone reports that the children tend to be unafraid of being themselves—they freely express their thoughts and emotions without concern of how smart or silly they sound. This authenticity allows them to engage in more candid and deeper exchanges.

The chapters on politics and death further support the children’s claim about their capabilities. Given that Western cultures have regarded politics and death as inappropriate topics for children, these two chapters function as powerful proof of children's sophisticated thinking. Chapter 4, “Political Voices,” challenges the traditional deficient conception of childhood by showing how nicely a group of eleven-year-olds addresses topics that are allegedly too complicated and irrelevant to children, such as fairness, environmental justice, sexism, and racism. Lone argues that each child’s life has political dimensions in which they face discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, class, or education status, just as adults do. Additionally, she makes a significant point about the nature of the hardships children face, rightly pointing out that children are exposed to difficulties that adults do not face, arising from the intersection of their marginalized group identity as children and their other social identities. Though the centeredness of politics in children’s life is not a novel claim, Lone succeeds in calling attention to the intersectionality of children's oppression.
Although children’s lives are deeply rooted in political issues, there could still be a concern that politics are too sophisticated for them. One might have concerns about a child expressing provocative ideas that are inadvertently offensive, as one of the children in Lone’s groups did when he suggested segregation as a solution to racism. However, Lone reports that the children were mature enough to consider that proposal carefully—they appeared to separate the suggestion from the student himself and offered reasoned criticisms of his idea. This episode nicely emphasizes the merits of children’s openness and authenticity, which contribute to philosophical inquiry and effectively allay the potential worry.

Chapter 6, “Death,” considers death, another putatively sensitive topic that Western cultures try to keep from children. Lone contends that death is not as unfamiliar a topic to children as politics is. Some children have already feared their own deaths or experienced the deaths of pets and family members. They have, therefore, thought about the meaning of life and death, the afterlife, and the mind-body problem to some extent. Lone provides excerpts when children’s imagination and openheartedness lead them to consider many creative scenarios regarding death, which supports her and her students’ claims that the children’s traits contribute to profound philosophical discussions.

Lone concludes the book by offering solutions to the phenomenon of children not being heard—listening to children. She says that as adults, when conversing with a child, we usually “recognize the words being said to us, but we don’t stop to appreciate what the speaker is trying to tell us” (158). Since we assume that we already know what children have to say, or even what they can say, Lone argues that we do not take their remarks seriously. To listen to children, Lone says adults should equip themselves with the qualities of children—curiosity, openheartedness, and imagination. Furthermore, she argues that allowing for silence, not responding immediately, is important when listening to children. It gives speakers time to gather their thoughts and finish expressing them as they wish and leaves time for the listener to observe the speaker’s nonverbal expression, another crucial aspect of listening.

*Seen and Not Heard* will appeal to a general audience, including parents, family members, caregivers, and educators of children, especially those who have denigrated children’s capacity for critical thinking. As for Philosophy for/with Children (P4/wC) scholars and practitioners who have already seen and heard children as sophisticated thinkers, this book will likely resonate with their experiences but ultimately will not add to their toolkit. On the one hand, for the general public Lone’s book will be a valuable introduction to the conception of children as young philosophers. These readers will find that Lone challenges their unexamined assumptions about children and makes a persuasive argument in favor of seeing children as original and capable thinkers.
On the other hand, methodologically, I would have liked to see more information about how she chose the short excerpts from the dialogues. In her excerpts, most of the speakers appear to participate actively and state their opinions fairly clearly. However, as with adults, there are varying dynamics among children in their philosophical exchanges—differences in how many times each child speaks, how they present their views, how they rearticulate and develop their ideas in response to others’ comments, and so on. Longer excerpts would have revealed some of these dynamics as well as the liveliness of the children’s discussions, providing a better understanding of how these children actually engage in philosophical dialogues. Such an addition would also assuage a skeptic’s doubts about the accuracy of the representation of children’s discussions and other potential suspicions regarding the excerpts and how they might be selectively focused on a few outstanding students. Furthermore, although Lone is excellent at listening to children in her analysis, longer excerpts, including her communications with the children, would allow readers to fully comprehend the importance of listening to, and actually hearing, children.

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References

Roberta Israeloff and Karen Mizell’s edited book *The Ethics Bowl Way* provides an important service to the growing Ethics Bowl community. The book, part of the excellent Rowman & Littlefield series on precollege philosophy edited by Thomas E. Wartenberg, is a valuable primer on all things Ethics Bowl. Composed of fourteen chapters written by a strong group of contributors, the volume describes the educational value of the Ethics Bowl, provides guidance for participants and organizers, and highlights a wide range of venues for hosting Ethics Bowls outside their original home in intercollegiate competition. To my knowledge no other all-in-one-place book exists that both explains core features of Ethics Bowl and presents its many possible extensions. It will be a helpful handbook for new coaches and participants and an instructive read for those looking to revitalize or reimagine their current engagement with Ethics Bowl. Less pragmatically, Ethics Bowl enthusiasts, like me, will enjoy the contributors’ articulations of just what makes Ethics Bowl such a distinctive, vital, and enriching educational experience and their reflections on the joys that involvement in Ethics Bowl can bring.

The book’s fourteen chapters are organized into three parts: “Ethics Bowl Basics,” “Best Practices,” and “Expanding the Reach of Ethics Bowl.” Each chapter is brief—six to ten pages—and closes with a testimonial from an Ethics Bowl team member. The testimonials are a nice way of including participants’ voices, though they could have come from a broader representation of Ethics Bowlers. (All but two quotations are from high school Ethics Bowlers.) The concise chapters allow the book to cover a wide range of topics in a short time. Readers can quickly glean many ideas to test out and can use the book’s chapters as jumping-off points for further reading on topics that particularly interest them. (The “References and Resources” section at the end of the book can help facilitate such searches.)

The well-chosen group of contributors includes a who’s who of individuals who have worked to establish, grow, and extend Ethics Bowl over the years. This starts with Ethics Bowl’s founder, Robert F. Ladenson, whose chapter begins
the “Ethics Bowl Basics” section of the book. This chapter and the one immediately following, by Kyle Robertson, convincingly locate the central educational significance of Ethics Bowl in its ability to model and inculcate virtues of discourse in a democratic society. As such these chapters present a persuasive case for educators who are considering adopting Ethics Bowl practices (or those who are looking for cogent statements of the value of their existing Ethics Bowl programs). Both Ladenson and Robertson discuss how Ethics Bowl’s structure requires participants to carefully consider viewpoints different from their own and engage collaboratively and respectfully. Ladenson concludes that Ethics Bowl can help model an ideal of an ethical community. Robertson differentiates Ethics Bowl’s dialogic style of argument, which emphasizes open-minded, collaborative, and honest truth-seeking inquiry, from adversarial forms of debate, which, he argues, encourage partisan gamesmanship and can exacerbate psychological tendencies that impede truth-seeking inquiry. Both Ladenson and Robertson provide compelling statements of what Ethics Bowl can be at its best, as does Andrew Cullison in his chapter on the life skills fostered by participation in Ethics Bowl. However, as some other chapters make clear, Ethics Bowls can sometimes fall short of these ideals.

No chapter better captures Ethics Bowl’s potential and pitfalls than Jana Mohr Lone’s contribution on inclusivity in the high school Ethics Bowl. Mohr Lone describes the iterative process the Washington State High School Ethics Bowl has undertaken to become more inclusive. Admirably, after realizing that the event’s structure disadvantaged lower-resourced and more diverse schools, the event’s organizers introduced a number of innovations, including overhauling the scoring rubric, introducing a “cold case” round in which teams receive cases for which neither team had prepared, and adding an “open dialogue” section in each round in which teams talk freely with each other. Feedback showed that these changes helped improve the inclusiveness of the event.

In a similar vein, Jeanine DeLay’s chapter identifies values present in Ethics Bowl’s design and then details steps the Michigan Regional High School Ethics Bowl has taken to help it better realize them. For instance, to enhance inclusivity, the Michigan Bowl formed a local group of Community Case Writers who come from different walks of life. To advance equity they have developed the Philosopher Coach Initiative, which pairs philosophy graduate-student coaches with local high school teams. Notably both of these chapters focus on Ethics Bowl at the high school level. The book—and the collegiate Ethics Bowl community—would benefit from discussion of reforms and innovations that have been or could be tried in the Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl, particularly since the obstacles to inclusivity and equity that Mohr Lone and DeLay discuss, such as disparities in resources, are present at the collegiate level too. That said, the book’s extensive treatment of precollege and other noncollegiate forms of Ethics Bowl is a definite strength.
The third part of the book includes five chapters on different ways to expand Ethics Bowl’s reach. In a standout chapter, Michael Vazquez outlines many different possibilities for employing Ethics Bowl in adult education: for educational professionals, in the workplace, for public servants, for older adults, and intergenerationally. Like Mohr Lone and DeLay, Vazquez includes thoughtful, concrete suggestions for adaptations that can be made in these different contexts, such as semi-structured discussions in senior centers. In his contribution on the future of Ethics Bowl, Alex M. Richardson builds on these chapters by describing recent programs the National High School Ethics Bowl has implemented that are intended to advance inclusivity and equity; he also mentions that the Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl’s Summer Workshop series has begun to address these issues.

The middle section of the book, “Best Practices,” addresses how to approach Ethics Bowl for different types of participants, including case writers, coaches, and judges. This portion of the book offers the most concrete guidance for those starting out in Ethics Bowl. But whether veteran or new to these roles, readers will appreciate the insights offered by the experienced authors of these chapters. For instance Peggy Connolly’s chapter on case writing includes many specific recommendations that can help hone the analytic skills of teams and coaches as well as prospective case writers. However, among an otherwise excellent list of recommendations, her claim that “polarizing topics” can weaken cases is questionable. Connolly argues that polarizing topics “encourage diatribes, not dialogue” and that Ethics Bowl’s requirement that team members defend a unified position can lead team members who hold a minority viewpoint to feel denigrated. She offers embryonic stem cell research as an example of a polarizing topic (Connolly 2022, 43-44). Though Connolly is right that these dangers exist—I have seen them play out firsthand in my own experience as an Ethics Bowl coach—there’s a greater risk in not addressing such topics in Ethics Bowl. As argued in the Ladenson and Robertson chapters, Ethics Bowl’s dialogic, collaborative structure can provide an antidote to the polarization and demonization that plague public discourse in our society. If these topics are not discussed in Ethics Bowl, they will still be discussed in less optimal venues elsewhere. Notwithstanding this concern, readers will find Connolly’s chapter, like the other chapters in this section of the book, full of useful guidance.

All in all The Ethics Bowl Way provides a quick, wide sweep that highlights Ethics Bowl’s many virtues, effectively orients newcomers, and identifies exciting areas for future growth and refinement. The volume is a testament to why Ethics Bowl has expanded so rapidly and will help ensure it continues to do so in ways that embody Ladenson’s vision of an ethical community.

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References