

**Modified Text: Hegel's Lordship/Bondage paragraphs 178, & 186-196**

**178.** Self-consciousness exists as being in and being for itself inasmuch, and only inasmuch, as it exists in and for itself for another, i.e. inasmuch as it is acknowledged. It is therefore essentially one only in duplication, and reveals itself in a number of traits which have to be kept firmly apart, and yet reveal themselves as always melting into one another, and dissolving this apartness. **(Terms: self-consciousness, being in itself, being for self, and for another. )**

**186.** Self-consciousness is at first simple being-for-self which is attached to an immediate individuality which excludes all others from itself. Self at first confronts self, not as an infinite negation of the negation making all its own, but as a simple case of natural being facing another such case, both deeply absorbed in the business of living. Each is conscious only of its own being, and so has no true certainty of itself, since the being of the self is essentially a socially acknowledged being. **(Terms: infinite negation)**

**187.** Self-consciousness must, however, express itself as the negation of all mere objectivity and particularity. This initially takes the form of desiring the death of the other at the risk of its own life. Self-consciousness must be willing to sacrifice everything concrete for its own infinite self-respect and the similar respect of all others. A life-and-death struggle therefore ensues between the two rival self-consciousnesses. **(Term: death, life-and-death struggle)**

**188.** For both members to die in the life-and-death struggle would not, however, resolve the tension between them. (nor would the death of one of them do it.) Death certainly eliminates all opposition, but only for others, or in a 'dead' manner. Death does not preserve the struggle that it eliminates in and for the parties in question. For the preservation, it is essential that the parties in question should live.

**189.** The demotion of another self-consciousness so that it does not really compete with my self-consciousness, now takes the new form of making it thing-like and dependent, the self-consciousness of a slave as opposed to that of a master. That the two self-consciousnesses are at bottom the same becomes deeply veiled.

**190.** The self-consciousness of the master is essentially related to the being of the mere things he uses and uses up, and these he enjoys through the slave's self-consciousness. The slave prepares and arranges things for the enjoyment of the master. The self-consciousness of the master is likewise essentially related to the self-consciousness of the slave through the various punitive, constraining, and rewarding instruments which keep the slave enslaved. The slave working on things does not completely overcome their thingness, since they do not become what he wishes them to be or not for himself. It is the master who reaps the enjoyment from the slave's labours.

### **Master: 191-193**

**191.** We thus achieve an essentially unbalanced relation in which the slave altogether gives up his being-for-self in the favour of the master. The master uses the slave as an instrument to control the thing for its own (the master's) purposes, and not for the slave's, and the slave acquiesces to the situation. This means that his self-consciousness demands from a consciousness so degraded and distorted. What the master sees in the slave, or what the slave sees in the master is not what either sees in himself.

**192.** The master therefore paradoxically depends for his masterhood on the slave's self-consciousness, and entirely fails of the fully realized independence of status which his self-consciousness demands.

**193.** The *truth* of independent self-consciousness is therefore to be found rather in the slave's self-consciousness than in the master's. Each is therefore the inverse of what it immediately and superficially is given as being.

### **Fear/ Slave: 194-196**

**194.** The slave in his fearful respect for the master becomes shaken out of his narrow self-identifications and self-interest and rises to the absolute negativity, the disinterested all-embracingness of true self consciousness. He becomes the ideal which he contemplates in his master.

**195.** The slave has the further advantage that in working on the object he as it were preserves his labour, makes the outward thing his own and puts himself into it, whereas the master's dealings with the object end in vanishing enjoyments. The slave overcomes the otherness and mere existence of material thinghood more thoroughly than the master, and so achieves a more genuine self-consciousness.

**196.** The slave in overcoming the mere existence of material thinghood also rises above the fear which was his first reaction to absolute otherness as embodied in the master. Then he achieved self-consciousness in opposition to such otherness, now he achieves a self-consciousness not opposed to otherness, but which discovers itself in otherness. In shaping the thing creatively, he becomes aware of his own boundless originality. Hegel thinks that the discipline of service and obedience is essential to self-consciousness: mere mastery of things alone would not yield to it. Only the discipline of service enables the conscious being to master himself, i.e. his finite, contingent, natural self. Without this discipline formative ability would degenerate into narrow cleverness placed at the service of personal self-will. (Hegel suggests that a period of subjection to others is essential to the highest magisterial rationality. Not to have undergone such discipline results in a trivialization of self-consciousness which never rises above petty finite interests. It would seem that the permissive bringing-up of children is implicitly condemned, and that 'imperialism' and 'colonialism' at certain stages of development are given justification.)